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Abstract
We investigate the structure of good deal bounds, which are subin-
tervals of a no-arbitrage pricing bound, for financial market models
with convex constraints as an extension of Arai and Fukasawa [2].
The upper and lower bounds of a good deal bound are naturally de-
scribed by a convex risk measure. We call such a risk measure a good
deal valuation; and study its properties. We also discuss superhedg-
ing cost and Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing for convex con-
strained markets.
Keywords: Convex risk measure, Good deal bound, Convex con-
straints, Superhedging cost, Fundamental theorem of asset pricing
Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 91G99, 46N10, 91B30
JEL Classification: G11, G13, D81
1 Introduction
For a given contingent claim in an incomplete financial market, its price is
not determined uniquely under the no-arbitrage framework. Only a pric-
ing bound, called a no-arbitrage pricing bound, is provided. For a concrete
explanation, letting L be a linear space of measurable functions represent-
ing all future cash-flows, we describe our market with M ⊂ L the set of
0-attainable claims, that is, future payoffs which investors can replicate
completely with 0 initial cost. In this paper, M is assumed to be convex,
but not necessarily a cone. Defining a functional on L as
ρ0(x) := inf{r ∈ R| there exists m ∈ M such that r+m+ x ≥ 0}
for x ∈ L, we obtain that the superhedging cost and the no-arbitrage pricing
bound for claim x are given by ρ0(−x) and [−ρ0(x), ρ0(−x)] respectively.
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Generally speaking, the no-arbitrage pricing bound is too wide to be
useful as the collection of candidate prices from a practical point of view.
Thus, we focus on narrowing the interval of candidate prices. That is, ex-
cluding prices with low risk, called good deals, from the no-arbitrage pric-
ing bound, we construct a sharper pricing bound, called a good deal bound.
Whether a price is a good deal, depends on the investor’s risk preference.
For example, Cochrane and Saa´-Requejo [9] defined a good deal bound by
excluding prices with high Sharpe ratio. We do not treat any specific good
deal bound in this paper. Instead, we are interested in the entire structure
of good deal bounds. We regard the upper and lower bounds of a good
deal bound as functionals on L, denoted by a and b respectively. Thus, the
interval [b(x), a(x)], which is a subinterval of [−ρ0(x), ρ0(−x)], formulates
a good deal bound. As in Arai and Fukasawa [2], defining ρa(−x) := a(x),
it is natural that ρa becomes a convex risk measure. We call it a good deal
valuation (GDV, hereafter). That is, a GDV is defined as a convex risk mea-
sure describing the upper bound of a good deal bound. Similarly, defining
−ρb(x) := b(x), we can see that ρb is also a GDV, that is, it can describe the
upper bound of a different good deal bound.
Our aim of this paper is to study GDVs for the case where M is convex
along with the argument of [2], in which they studied GDVs thoroughly
when M is a convex cone. They showed that ρ0 is a coherent risk mea-
sure; and enumerated equivalent conditions for the existence of a GDV.
Besides, for a given convex risk measure, they gave a set of equivalent con-
ditions to be a GDV. In particular, they showed that ρ is a GDV if and only
if it is a risk indifference price. Furthermore, they extended the Kreps-Yan-
type Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing (FTAP, hereafter) to the equiv-
alence between the no-free-lunch condition (NFL, hereafter) and the exis-
tence of a relevant GDV. In addition to [2], there is much literature on good
deal bounds from the point of view of risk measures, say, Bion-Nadal [5],
Bion-Nadal and Di Nunno [6], Jaschke and Ku¨chler [19] and Staum [33].
But, no one studied good deal bounds for markets with convex constraints,
whereas such models appear frequently in mathematical finance, say, illiq-
uid market models, models with borrowing constraints and so on. Indeed,
there is much literature treating models with convex constraints: Cuoco
[10], Cvitanic´ and Karatzas [11] and [12], Karatzas and Kou [20], Larsen
and Zˇitkovic´ [24], Pennanen [26] and [27], Pennanen and Penner [28], and
so forth. See also examples introduced in Subsection 2.1.
Our main contribution is threefold as follows:
1. We begin with a study for the functional ρ0, since it expresses the
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upper and lower bounds of the no-arbitrage pricing bound. As seen
in [2], ρ0 is given as a coherent risk measure when M is a convex
cone. In this case, the set Q0 of all probability measures Q such that
supm∈M EQ[m] = 0, plays a central role to discuss not only ρ
0 but also
GDVs. On the other hand, excluding the cone property from M, ρ0 is
no longer coherent in general. In this setting, we need to consider, in-
stead ofQ0, the set, denoted byQ, of all probability measures Q such
that supm∈M EQ[m] is finite. In particular, we investigate properties
of the largest minorant of ρ0 with the Fatou property, since it is the
first candidate of GDVs.
2. We shall enumerate equivalent conditions for the existence of a GDV;
and introduce a set of equivalent conditions for a given convex risk
measure to be a GDV. In addition, we introduce an example of a GDV
which is not a risk indifference price. This shows that the structure of
good deal bounds is much different from that for the case where M is
a convex cone. Moreover, we give conditions for a GDV to be a risk
indifference price; and for a risk indifference price to be a GDV.
3. We deal with the Kreps-Yan-type FTAP. Kreps [23] proved that, ifM is
a convex cone,Q0 6= ∅ is equivalent to the NFL, that is, the weak clo-
sure of M does not include any nonzero nonnegative claims. More-
over, [2] showed that the existence of a relevant GDV is equivalent
to the NFL. Thus, we expect naturally that, when M is convex, the
equivalence holds true among the NFL, the existence of a relevant
GDV and a condition related to Q. Indeed, we shall see the equiv-
alence between the first two conditions, but illustrate counterexam-
ples for the last one. Some variants of FTAP for constrained models
have been introduced by Carassus, Pham and Touzi [7], Evstigneev,
Schu¨rger and Taksar [16], [26], Rokhlin [30], Roux [31] and so on.
Thus, our contribution is to treat FTAP comprehensively for models
with convex constraints.
An outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe our
model; and prepare some terminologies and mathematical preliminaries.
In particular, since we take an Orlicz space (or heart) as L, we introduce
some terminologies on Orlicz space. We study ρ0 in Section 3. Section 4 is
devoted to study properties of GDVs. FTAP will be discussed in Section 5;
and conclusions are given in Section 6.
3
2 Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, we fix a complete probability space (Ω,F ,P). Note
that we denote by N the set of all positive integers; and by L0 the set of all
R-valued measurable functions on (Ω,F). Moreover, for a set of measur-
able functions X, we denote X+ (resp. X−):= {x ∈ X|x ≥ 0 a.s. (resp. ≤)}.
We start with definitions of Young function, Orlicz heart and Orlicz
space.
Definition 2.1 1. An even lower semi-continuous convex function Φ :
R → R ∪ {∞} is called a Young function, if it satisfies the following:
(a) Φ(0) = 0,
(b) Φ(α) ↑ ∞ as α ↑ ∞,
(c) Φ(α) < ∞ for α in a neighborhood of 0.
2. For a Young function Φ, a spaceMΦ ofmeasurable functions on (Ω,F)
defined as
MΦ := {x ∈ L0|E[Φ(cx)] < ∞ for any c > 0}
is called Orlicz heart with Φ. In addition, a space LΦ defined as
LΦ := {x ∈ L0|E[Φ(cx)] < ∞ for some c > 0}
is called Orlicz space with Φ.
3. The complimentary function of Φ is defined as
Ψ(β) := sup
α∈R
{αβ−Φ(α)}
for any β ∈ R. Note that Ψ is also a Young function.
Any Young function is continuous on [0,∞) except for possibly a single
point at which it jumps to +∞. Both MΦ and LΦ are Banach lattices with
norm ‖x‖ := inf{c > 0|E[Φ(x/c)] ≤ 1} and pointwise ordering in the
almost sure sense. When Φ is finite, LΦ = MΦ if and only if we can find
c > 0 and α0 > 0 such that Φ(2α) ≤ cΦ(α) for any α ≥ α0. Thus, when
Φ(α) = |α|p with p ≥ 1, we have MΦ = LΦ = Lp. On the other hand,
if Φ(α) = e|α| − 1, MΦ is a proper subset of LΦ. Moreover, if Φ takes the
value ∞, say, Φ(α) = |α| if |α| ≤ 1; = ∞ otherwise, then LΦ = L∞ and
MΦ = {0}. In this paper, we fix a Young function Φ; and denote by Ψ
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its complimentary function. Note that LΨ is the dual space of MΦ, that
is, the set of all continuous linear functionals on MΦ. For example, when
MΦ = Lp for p > 1, LΨ = L
p
p−1 . Moreover, the dual space of LΦ may
include a singular part. For more details on Orlicz space, see Edgar and
Sucheston [15] and Rao and Ren [29].
Let L be either MΦ or LΦ, which is regarded as the set of all future cash-
flows. We denote by L∗ its dual space. This setting would be natural, since
it covers wide classes including all Lp spaces with p ∈ [1,∞]; and fits to
utility maximization problems (see Arai [1], [2], Biagini and Frittelli [3] and
Cheridito and Li [8]). Moreover, let M be a convex subset of L including
L−. The set M expresses the set of all 0-attainable claims: future payoffs
which investors can purchase without initial cost. Although M is assumed
to be a convex cone in [2], we generalize it to the convex case by excluding
the cone property from M.
For later use, we prepare some notation.
Definition 2.2 1. P := {Q≪ P|dQ/dP ∈ LΨ},
2. L∗1 := {g ∈ L
∗|g(1) = 1, g(x) ≥ 0 for any x ∈ L+},
3. L
∗
:= {g ∈ L∗1| supm∈M g(m) < ∞},
4. Q := {Q ∈ P| supm∈M EQ[m] < ∞},
5. Qe := {Q ∈ Q|Q ∼ P},
6. Q0 := {Q ∈ Q| supm∈M EQ[m] = 0}.
Remark 2.3 When M is a convex cone, supm∈M EQ[m] becomes either 0 or
∞ for Q ∈ P , that is,Q andQ0 coincide. On the other hand, supm∈M EQ[m]
may take a positive number in our setting.
2.1 Examples for convex markets
Here we introduce some examples such that M is convex, but not a cone.
Example 2.4 (A simple illiquid market model) We consider a one-period
binomial model in which one riskless asset with zero interest rate and one
risky asset are tradable. For t = 0, 1, let St be the price of the risky asset
at time t. We assume that S0 ∈ R and S := S1 − S0 belongs to L. We take
into account nonlinear illiquidity effects denoted by a function f : R → R.
More precisely, we assume that, for any α ∈ R, it costs αS0 + f (α) to get α
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units of the risky asset. It seems that f (α) describes the extra cost for pur-
chasing α units of the risky asset. Now, suppose that f is a continuous con-
vex function with f (0) = 0, non-increasing on (−∞, 0] and non-decreasing
on [0,∞). For example, f (α) = e|α| − 1 or f (α) = α2. As a result, the set of
all 0-attainable claims is expressed as
M = {αS− f (α)|α ∈ R} − L+,
which forms a convex subset of L including L−, but not necessarily a cone.
Example 2.5 (Constraints on number of shares) Consider a continuous trad-
ing model with maturity T ∈ (0,∞). Suppose that one riskless asset with
zero interest rate and d risky assets are tradable; and the price of the risky
assets is described by an Rd-valued locally bounded RCLL special semi-
martingale S defined on a complete probability space (Ω,F , P;F = {Ft}t∈[0,T]),
where F is a filtration satisfying the so-called usual condition, that is, F is
right-continuous, FT = F and F0 contains all null sets of F . Let L(S) be
the set of all Rd-valued S-integrable predictable processes; and Gt(ϑ) :=∫ t
0 ϑsdSs for any t ∈ [0, T] and any ϑ ∈ L(S). Note that ϑ ∈ L(S) denotes
the number of shares the investor holds; and the process G(ϑ) represents
the gain process induced by a self-financing strategy ϑ. Now, we impose
convex constraints on the set of all admissible strategies. That is, we con-
sider the case where the set of 0-attainable claims is given as
M = {GT(ϑ)|ϑ ∈ L(S), ϑt ∈ K for any t ∈ [0, T]} ∩ L− L+,
where K is a convex subset of Rd including 0. We introduce some concrete
examples of K as follows:
1. (Rectangular constraints)K = [a1, b1]× [a2, b2]× · · · × [ad, bd] for some
fixed numbers −∞ ≤ ai ≤ 0 ≤ bi ≤ ∞, i = 1, 2, . . . , d.
2. (Constraints on total number of shares) K = {(h1, . . . , hd) ∈ R
d|hi ≥
0 for each 1 ≤ i ≤ d,∑di=1 hi ≤ c} for some positive constant c.
3. (Short-sale constraints) K = {(h1, . . . , hd) ∈ R
d|hi ≥ −c for each 1 ≤
i ≤ d} for some positive constant c.
For more details, see [10], [11] and [12].
Example 2.6 (Constraints on amount invested) We consider the samemodel
as the previous example; and assume that S > 0 and M is given as
M = {GT(ϑ)|ϑ ∈ L(S), ϑtSt− ∈ K for any t ∈ [0, T]} ∩ L− L+,
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where K is a convex subset of Rd including 0, and ϑS− = (ϑ1S1−, . . . , ϑ
dSd−)
represents the amount invested in each asset. The three examples for K
introduced in Example 2.5 are also typical examples for the present setting.
Example 2.7 (a-admissible) We consider the samemathematical framework
as Example 2.5. Let a be a positive real number. ϑ ∈ L(S) is said to be a-
admissible if Gt(ϑ) ≥ −a for any t ∈ [0, T]. When M is given as
M = {GT(ϑ)|ϑ ∈ L(S) is a-admissible } ∩ L− L+ (2.1)
for fixed a > 0, it forms a convex set. On the other hand, whenM is denoted
by M = {GT(ϑ)|ϑ ∈ L(S) is a-admissible for some a > 0} ∩ L− L+, it is a
convex cone. Formore details, see Section 9 in Delbaen and Schachermayer
[14].
Example 2.8 (W-admissible) In the previous example, when S is not nec-
essarily locally bounded, M defined in (2.1) may become {0}. As a natural
way to avoid it, we introduceW-admissibility. LetW be a random variable
in L with W ≥ 1. ϑ ∈ L(S) is said to be W-admissible if Gt(ϑ) ≥ −W for
any t ∈ [0, T]. Then, M = {GT(ϑ)|ϑ ∈ L(S) is W-admissible } ∩ L − L+
formulates a convex market.
Example 2.9 (Predictably convexity) We introduce the predictably convex-
ity, which brings us an important class of models with convex constraints.
It has been undertaken by Fo¨llmer and Kramkov [17]; and discussed in
Chapter 9 of Fo¨llmer and Schied [18] for discrete time models. See also
[1], Klo¨ppel and Schweizer [22]. Now, we define it as follows: A family of
semimartingales S is said to be predictably convex if, for any S1, S2 ∈ S
and any [0, 1]-valued predictable process h,
∫ ·
0
hdS1 +
∫ ·
0
(1 − h)dS2 be-
longs to S . For the three examples of portfolio constraints in Example
2.5, their Ms are predictably convex. Here we consider the same contin-
uous trading model as Example 2.5, provided that S is possibly nonlocally
bounded. Now, we fix an FT-measurable random variable W ∈ L with
W ≥ 1 satisfying, for each i = 1, . . . , d, there exists ϑi ∈ L(Si) such that
P({ω| there exists t ∈ [0, T] such that ϑit(ω) = 0}) = 0 and |
∫ t
0
ϑisdS
i
s| ≤ W
for any t ∈ [0, T]. In addition, we denote
ΘW := {ϑ ∈ L(S)|there exists c > 0 such that Gt(ϑ) ≥ −cW
for any t ∈ [0, T]},
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and G(ΘW) := {G(ϑ)|ϑ ∈ ΘW}. Let S be a predictably convex subset
of G(ΘW), and ΘS the corresponding subset of ΘW to S . That is, we can
describe S = {G(ϑ)|ϑ ∈ ΘS}. Now, we denote
M =
{
GT(ϑ)|ϑ ∈ Θ
S
}
− L+, (2.2)
which is convex.
2.2 Convex risk measure
We define convex risk measures and some related terminologies. In addi-
tion, we introduce a representation result.
Definition 2.10 1. A (−∞,∞]-valued functional ρ defined on L is called
a convex risk measure if ρ satisfies, for any x, y ∈ L,
properness: ρ(0) < ∞,
monotonicity: ρ(x) ≥ ρ(y) if x ≤ y,
cash-invariance: ρ(x+ r) = ρ(x)− r for any r ∈ R,
convexity: ρ(λx+(1−λ)y) ≤ λρ(x)+ (1−λ)ρ(x) for any λ ∈ [0, 1].
2. In addition, a convex risk measure ρ is a coherent risk measure if it
satisfies
positive homogeneity: ρ(λx) = λρ(x) for any x ∈ L and any λ ≥ 0.
Definition 2.11 1. Let f be a [−∞,∞]-valued functional on L.
(a) If f (0) = 0, then f is said to be normalized.
(b) f is said to have the Fatou property if limn→∞ f (−xn) = f (−x)
for any increasing sequence {xn} ⊂ L with xn ↑ x.
(c) f is said to be relevant if f (−z) > 0 for any z ∈ L+ \ {0}.
(d) We define the penalty function for f as
f ∗(g) := sup
x∈L
{g(−x)− f (x)} (2.3)
for g ∈ L∗1. In particular, we denote, for Q ∈ P ,
f ∗(Q) := sup
x∈L
{EQ[−x]− f (x)}. (2.4)
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2. We denote by R the set of all normalized convex risk measures on L
with the Fatou property.
Theorem 2.12 (Proposition 1 of [3]) Any ρ ∈ R is represented as
ρ(x) = sup
Q∈P
{EQ[−x]− ρ
∗(Q)}.
2.3 A separating result
We prepare a proposition, which will appear over and over again in the
sequel. Now, we denote by M (resp. Ms) the closure of M in σ(L, LΨ) (resp.
in ‖ · ‖).
Proposition 2.13 Let B ⊂ L+ be a convex set including at least one positive
constant.
1. If B is ‖ · ‖-compact and Ms ∩ B = ∅, then there exists a g ∈ L
∗
such that
sup
m∈Ms
g(m) < inf
x∈B
g(x). (2.5)
2. If B is σ(L, LΨ)-compact and M ∩ B = ∅, then there exists a Q ∈ Q such
that
sup
m∈M
EQ[m] < inf
x∈B
EQ[x].
Proof. It suffices to show only the first assertion. By the conditions, the
Hahn-Banach separating theorem implies the existence of g ∈ L∗ satisfying
(2.5). Remark that supm∈Ms g(m) ≥ 0 because 0 ∈ M. Thus, we have
g(1) > 0, since B includes at least one positive constant. Without loss of
generality, we may assume g(1) = 1. Moreover, since L− ⊂ M, g ∈ L∗1
holds true. In addition, Definition 2.2 implies that the LHS of (2.5) takes
the value ∞ unless g ∈ L
∗
. Thus, g belongs to L
∗
. ✷
3 Superhedging cost
Superhedging cost for a claim is defined as the lowest price of the claim
which enables investors to construct an arbitrage opportunity by selling the
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claim and selecting a suitable strategy from M. More precisely, defining a
functional ρ0 on L as
ρ0(x) := inf{r ∈ R| there exists m ∈ M such that r+m+ x ≥ 0}, (3.1)
the superhedging cost for claim x is given by ρ0(−x); and the no-arbitrage
pricing bound for x is given by [−ρ0(x), ρ0(−x)]. Note that GDVs will
be defined by using ρ0 in Section 4. Thus, we investigate properties of ρ0
which we will need for studying GDVs.
Lemma 3.1 (ρ0)∗(g) = supm∈M g(m) for any g ∈ L
∗
1, where (ρ
0)∗ is the
penalty function for ρ0 defined in (2.3).
Proof. Since ρ0(−m) ≤ 0 for any m ∈ M, (2.3) implies that (ρ0)∗(g) ≥
supm∈M
{
g(m)− ρ0(−m)
}
≥ supm∈M g(m) for any g ∈ L
∗
1. On the other
hand, for any x ∈ L with ρ0(x) < ∞, we take an r > ρ0(x) arbitrarily.
There is then an mx,r ∈ M satisfying r + mx,r + x ≥ 0. Since g(mx,r) ≤
supm∈M g(m) for any g ∈ L
∗
1, we have supm∈M g(m) ≥ g(−x) − r, that is,
supm∈M g(m) ≥ g(−x) − ρ
0(x). In addition, this inequality also holds for
any x ∈ L with ρ0(x) = ∞. Therefore, we have supx∈L{g(−x) − ρ
0(x)} ≤
supm∈M g(m) for any g ∈ L
∗
1. Consequently, (ρ
0)∗(g) = supm∈M g(m) for
any g ∈ L∗1. ✷
Proposition 3.2 L
∗
6= ∅ if and only if ρ0 is a convex risk measure on L.
Proof. “only if” part: Firstly, the monotonicity and cash-invariance are
obvious. Next, we see ρ0 > −∞. Assuming that there exists an x ∈ L with
ρ0(x) = −∞, (3.1) implies that for any c > 0, we can find an mc ∈ M such
that −c+ mc + x ≥ 0. Thus, for any g ∈ L
∗
, we have g(x) ≥ c− (ρ0)∗(g)
for any c > 0 by Lemma 3.1, that is, g(x) = ∞. This is a contradiction, so
ρ0 is (−∞,∞]-valued; and has the properness because ρ0(0) ≤ 0. Lastly,
we see the convexity of ρ0. Fix x1, x2 ∈ L and λ ∈ [0, 1] arbitrarily. Now,
we assume that both ρ0(x1) and ρ
0(x2) are finite. Otherwise, the convexity
holds clearly. Taking ri > ρ
0(xi) for i = 1, 2 arbitrarily, the convexity of M
implies λr1 + (1− λ)r2 ≥ ρ
0(λx1 + (1− λ)x2), from which the convexity
of ρ0 follows.
“if” part: Suppose that L
∗
= ∅. Assuming that there exists a c > 0
with c /∈ Ms, Proposition 2.13 implies the existence of g ∈ L
∗
satisfying c >
supm∈Ms g(m), which is a contradiction. As a result, any c > 0 is included in
Ms. Now, for any k ∈ N, we take an mk ∈ M satisfying ‖2
k −mk‖ ≤ 1. We
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define xn := ∑
n
k=1 |2
k −mk|2
−k for any n ∈ N∪ {∞}. Then, xn converges to
x∞ a.s.; and {xn} is a Cauchy sequence in ‖ · ‖. Hence, Lemma 3.3 provides
x∞ ∈ L. Noting that x∞ ≥ xn ≥ ∑
n
k=1(2
k − mk)2
−k = n− ∑nk=1mk2
−k for
any n ∈ N, and ρ0(−m) ≤ 0 for any m ∈ M, we have
ρ0(x∞) ≤ −n+
n
∑
k=1
2−kρ0(−mk) +
(
1−
n
∑
k=1
2−k
)
ρ0(0) ≤ −n
for any n ∈ N. Consequently, ρ0(x∞) = −∞, which is a contradiction. ✷
Lemma 3.3 Let {xn}n≥1 be a Cauchy sequence on (L, ‖ · ‖) which converges to
x∞ a.s. Then, {xn} converges to x∞ in ‖ · ‖, that is, x∞ ∈ L.
Proof. Since {xn} is a Cauchy sequence, there exists an x′∞ ∈ L such that
‖xn − x′∞‖ → 0 by the completeness of (L, ‖ · ‖). In addition, Proposition
2.1.10 (6) of [15] implies that xn tends to x
′
∞ in probability. Hence, x∞ =
x′∞ ∈ L. ✷
Remark 3.4 In the proof of Proposition 3.2, we see x∞ ∈ L. At first glance,
it seems to be shown easier as follows: ‖x∞‖ = ‖∑
∞
k=1 |2
k − mk|2
−k‖ ≤
∑
∞
k=1 2
−k‖2k −mk‖ < ∞, which implies x∞ ∈ L. However, this is not accu-
rate. Firstly, the former inequality is not trivial. Besides, even if ‖x∞‖ < ∞,
x∞ does not necessarily belong to L, since L may be M
Φ a proper subset of
LΦ.
Remark 3.5 When M is a convex cone, (ρ0)∗ takes the values 0 and ∞ only.
Thus, ρ0 is a coherent risk measure if and only if L
∗
6= ∅. For more details,
see [2].
Example 3.6 For the case where M = [0, 1] − L+ = {x ∈ L|x ≤ 1}, ρ0
becomes a convex risk measure. Indeed, g(x) := E[x] belongs to L
∗
. On
the other hand, setting M = [0,∞) − L+ = {x ∈ L|x ∨ 0 ∈ L∞}, we have
ρ0(0) = −∞, that is, ρ0 is not a convex risk measure. In this case, L
∗
is
empty evidently.
Remark 3.7 We consider the concept of no arbitrage of the first kind, which
is weaker than the NFL and the no-free-lunch with vanishing risk. We call
z ∈ L+\{0} an arbitrage of the first kind if, for any ε > 0, we can find an
m ∈ M such that ε + m − z ≥ 0. For more details on arbitrage of the first
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kind, see Kardaras [21]. We can see immediately that, for z ∈ L+\{0}, it
is an arbitrage of the first kind if and only if ρ0(−z) = 0. In other words,
there is no arbitrage of the first kind if and only if ρ0 is relevant.
Now,we define a functional ρ̂0, which is closely related to superhedging
cost, as follows:
ρ̂0(x) :=
{
supQ∈Q{EQ[−x]− (ρ
0)∗(Q)} if Q 6= ∅,
−∞ otherwise.
Note that (ρ0)∗(Q) is defined in (2.4). We introduce a proposition, some
lemmas and examples related to ρ̂0.
Proposition 3.8 The following are equivalent:
1. Q 6= ∅.
2. ρ̂0 is the largest convex risk measure with the Fatou property less than ρ0.
3. There exists a c ≥ 0 such that P(m > c) < 1 for any m ∈ M.
4. There exists a c > 0 such that c /∈ M.
Proof. 1⇔2: This equivalence is the very definition of ρ̂0.
1⇒3: SupposingQ 6= ∅ and taking aQ ∈ Q arbitrarily, we have (ρ0)∗(Q) ∈
[0,∞) and EQ[m]− (ρ
0)∗(Q) ≤ 0 for anym ∈ M, that is, Q(m− (ρ0)∗(Q) ≤
0) > 0 for any m ∈ M. Hence, P(m > (ρ0)∗(Q)) < 1 for any m ∈ M.
3⇒4: If c ∈ M for any c > 0, condition 3 is false, since P(c+ 1 > c) = 1
for any c ≥ 0.
4⇒1: Taking a c > 0 which is not included in M, Proposition 2.13 ensures
that Q is nonempty, since {c} is compact. ✷
Example 3.9 We illustrate an example in which ρ0 6= ρ̂0 holds. Let Ω =
{ωk; k ∈ N}, P({ωk}) > 0 for k ∈ N, and
M =
{
∞
∑
k=1
ϑk1{ωk}|0 ≤ ϑk ≤ 1 for any k ∈ N,
ϑk = 0 except for finitely many ks
}
− L+.
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Since P ∈ Q, ρ̂0 has the Fatou property by Proposition 3.8. On the other
hand, letting xn := ∑
n
k=1 1{ωk} for n ∈ N, we have ρ
0(−xn) = 0 for any
n ∈ N, although ρ0(−1) = 1 and xn tends to 1. Thus, ρ0 does not possess
the Fatou property. Another example in which ρ0 6= ρ̂0 holds has been
introduced in [2].
Lemma 3.10 The following are equivalent:
1. Q 6= ∅ and infQ∈Q(ρ
0)∗(Q) = 0.
2. −ρ0(x) ≤ −ρ̂0(x) ≤ ρ̂0(−x) ≤ ρ0(−x) for any x ∈ L.
3. ρ̂0(0) = ρ0(0) = 0.
4. ρ̂0(0) = 0.
Proof. 1⇒2: Proposition 3.8 yields that ρ̂0 ≤ ρ0. The convexity of ρ̂0
implies that ρ̂0(x) + ρ̂0(−x) ≥ 2ρ̂0(0) = −2 infQ∈Q(ρ
0)∗(Q) = 0, from
which the implication follows.
2⇒3: Substituting 0 for x, we have ρ0(0) ≥ ρ̂0(0) ≥ −ρ̂0(0). Thus, ρ0(0) ≥
ρ̂0(0) ≥ 0 holds. In addition, (3.1) implies that ρ0(0) ≤ 0.
3⇒4: Obvious.
4⇒1: By the definition of ρ̂0, Q 6= ∅ is ensured. Moreover, 0 = ρ̂0(0) =
− infQ∈Q(ρ
0)∗(Q) holds true. ✷
Example 3.11 The condition “Q 6= ∅” does not ensure “infQ∈Q(ρ
0)∗(Q) =
0”. We consider the following simple model: Set Ω = {ω1,ω2}, and S =
1{ω1} +
1
21{ω2}. Note that we do not need to specify Φ. Let us consider
the case where M is given by {ϑS|ϑ ∈ [0, 1]} − L+. In this case, we have
P = Q 6= ∅ and infQ∈Q(ρ
0)∗(Q) = infQ∈Q EQ[S] =
1
2 . Hence, ρ̂
0(0) = − 12 ,
that is, ρ̂0 is not normalized.
Remark 3.12 Condition 1 in Lemma 3.10 is equivalent to Q0 6= ∅ when M
is a convex cone. Actually, it will play a similar role to “Q0 6= ∅” in the
convex cone case as in [2].
Example 3.13 By Lemma 3.10, ρ0(0) = 0 whenever ρ̂0(0) = 0, while its
reverse implication does not hold. We reconsider Example 3.9. Now, we
assume ρ0(0) < 0. Letting r = −ρ
0(0)
2 (> 0), there exists an m ∈ M such
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that m ≥ r, which means m(ωk) ≥ r for any k ∈ N. This is a contradiction.
As a result, ρ0(0) = 0. Next, we calculate ρ̂0(0). Note that Q 6= ∅. For
any Q ∈ Q and any ε > 0, we can find a finite set A ⊂ Ω satisfying
Q(A) > 1 − ε. Thus, for any ε > 0, there exists an m ∈ M such that
EQ[m] > 1− ε. So that, (ρ
0)∗(Q) = 1 for any Q ∈ Q. Consequently, we
have ρ̂0(0) = −1.
Lemma 3.14 If there exists a Q ∈ Qe with (ρ0)∗(Q) = 0, then ρ̂0 is relevant.
Proof. Letting Q be an element of Qe with (ρ0)∗(Q) = 0, we have, for
any z ∈ L+\{0}, ρ̂0(−z) ≥ EQ[z]− (ρ
0)∗(Q) = EQ[z] > 0. ✷
Example 3.15 Even if infQ∈Q(ρ
0)∗(Q) = 0, we may have (ρ0)∗(Q) > 0 for
any Q ∈ Q. Now, we construct such an example. Set Ω = {ω0,ω1, . . . },
P({ωk}) =
1
2k+1
for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . . Letting M be given as {ϑS|ϑ ∈ [0, 1]} −
L+, where S(ωk) =
1
2k
for any k ∈ N, we have (ρ0)∗(Q) = EQ[S] > 0
for any Q ∈ Q. Defining a probability measure Qk for each k ∈ N as
Qk({ωl}) = 1{l=k} for l ∈ N ∪ {0}, we have Qk ∈ Q for each k ∈ N.
Then infQ∈Q(ρ
0)∗(Q) ≤ infk∈N(ρ
0)∗(Qk) = infk∈N
1
2k
= 0. As a result, the
condition in Lemma 3.14 is stronger than Condition 1 in Lemma 3.10 in
general.
Example 3.16 We consider the predictably convexity introduced in Exam-
ple 2.9; and illustrate representations of Q, Q0 and (ρ0)∗ for predictably
convex models. The following argument is based on Section 6 of [1]. Now,
we assume that M defined in (2.2) is included in L; and define
P(S) := {Q ∈ P| there exists increasing predictable process A such that
G(ϑ)− A is a Q-supermartingale for any ϑ ∈ ΘS}.
When Q ∈ P(S), G(ϑ) is a special semimartingale under Q for any ϑ ∈ ΘS
(Lemma 6.2 of [1]). Fixing Q ∈ P(S), we denote by Mϑ + Aϑ the canonical
decomposition of G(ϑ) under Q. Note that this decomposition depends on
Q. Now, we define A := {Aϑ|ϑ ∈ ΘS}. In addition, for two stochastic
processes X and Y, we define an order  as follows:
X  Y ⇐⇒ Y− X is an increasing process.
Remark that the ordered set (A,) is directed upward (Lemma 6.4 of [1]).
An increasing predictable process AS is called an upper variation process
of the ordered set (A,) if AS satisfies the following two conditions:
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1. A  AS for any A ∈ A,
2. if an increasing predictable process Â satisfies A  Â for any A ∈ A,
then AS  Â holds.
The following assertions are from Theorem 6.9 and Theorem 5.2 in [1].
1. We have Q = P(S) and
(ρ0)∗(Q) =
{
EQ[A
Q
T ] < ∞, if Q ∈ P(S),
∞, otherwise,
where A
Q
is an upper variation process for Q ∈ P(S).
2. Q0 = {Q ∈ P(S)| G(ϑ) is a Q-supermartingale for any ϑ ∈ ΘS}.
4 Good deal valuations
In this section, we investigate thoroughly properties of GDVs. Since any
good deal bound is given as a subinterval of the no-arbitrage pricing bound,
when we represent the upper and lower bounds of a good deal bound as
functionals a and b respectively, we have [b(x), a(x)] ⊂ [−ρ0(x), ρ0(−x)]
for any x ∈ L. Now, we define a functional ρ as ρ(−x) := a(x). It is then
natural that ρ is a normalized convex risk measure as discussed in [2]. We
call such a risk measure a GDV. Its precise definition is given as follows:
Definition 4.1 A convex risk measure ρ ∈ R is said to be a good deal val-
uation(GDV) if
ρ(−x) ∈ [−ρ0(x), ρ0(−x)] for any x ∈ L. (4.1)
Note that we consider only convex risk measures having the Fatou prop-
erty as GDVs in this paper. Although the definition (4.1) is given from the
seller’s view point, we can rewrite (4.1) as
− ρ(x) ∈ [−ρ0(x), ρ0(−x)] for any x ∈ L, (4.2)
which means that any GDV describes the lower bound of a good deal
bound. Indeed, denoting −ρb(x) := b(x), ρb satisfies (4.2). Furthermore,
note that any GDV ρ satisfies −ρ(x) ≤ ρ(−x) for any x ∈ L since ρ(x) +
ρ(−x) ≥ 2ρ(0) = 0 by the convexity. Then, for any GDV ρ, the interval
[−ρ(x), ρ(−x)] provides a good deal bound. Note that the upper and lower
bounds of a good deal bound are mostly described by different GDVs.
Now, we show equivalent conditions for the existence of a GDV.
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Theorem 4.2 The following are equivalent:
1. Q 6= ∅ and infQ∈Q(ρ
0)∗(Q) = 0.
2. ρ̂0 is a GDV.
3. There exists a GDV.
4. P(m > ε) < 1 for any ε > 0 and any m ∈ M.
5. c /∈ M for any c > 0.
Proof. 1⇒2: By Proposition 3.8 and Lemma 3.10.
2⇒3: Obvious.
3⇒1: Let ρ be a GDV. Since ρ(−m) ≤ ρ0(−m) ≤ 0 for any m ∈ M, we have
ρ∗(Q) = sup
x∈L
{EQ[−x]− ρ(x)} ≥ sup
m∈M
{EQ[m]− ρ(−m)}
≥ sup
m∈M
EQ[m] = (ρ
0)∗(Q). (4.3)
Thus, ρ∗(Q) = ∞ for any Q ∈ P\Q. Supposing Q = ∅, ρ equals to −∞
identically by Theorem 2.12. This is a contradiction. In addition, we have
0 ≤ infQ∈Q(ρ
0)∗(Q) ≤ infQ∈Q ρ
∗(Q) = 0 since ρ(0) = 0.
1⇒4: Supposing that there exist an ε > 0 and an m ∈ M such that P(m >
ε) = 1, we have EQ[m] > ε for any Q ∈ P . That is, supm∈M EQ[m] =
supm∈M EQ[m] > ε for any Q ∈ P . From the view of Lemma 3.1, either
Q = ∅ or infQ∈Q(ρ
0)∗(Q) > 0 holds true.
4⇒5: We can see this by contraposition.
5⇒1: We fix c > 0 arbitrarily. Since c /∈ M, Proposition 2.13 implies that
there exists a Qc ∈ Q such that (ρ0)∗(Qc) = supm∈M EQc [m] < c. By the
arbitrariness of c > 0, we have infQ∈Q(ρ
0)∗(Q) = 0. ✷
Remark 4.3 1. As seen in Example 3.15, even if there exists a GDV, we
may find an m ∈ M such that P(m > 0) = 1, that is, an arbitrage op-
portunity in a strong sense. In other words, all conditions in Theorem
4.2 are not sufficient for the no-arbitrage condition.
2. The condition Q 6= ∅ is not sufficient for ρ̂0 to be a GDV, since it is
not necessarily normalized. See Example 3.11.
3. The first condition in Theorem 4.2 is stronger than L
∗
6= ∅. That is, ρ0
is not necessarily a GDV even if L
∗
6= ∅. See Example 3.9.
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Remark 4.4 Theorem 3.2 of [2] provided equivalent conditions for the exis-
tence of a GDV whenM is a convex cone. Now, we shall compare Theorem
4.2 with it.
1. The third condition of Theorem 3.2 in [2]: “P(m > 0) < 1 for any
m ∈ M” is sufficient, but not necessary for the existence of a GDV in
our setting as seen in Example 3.15.
2. The fourth condition in [2]: “1 /∈ M” is equivalent to condition 5
in Theorem 4.2 when M is a convex cone, whereas condition 5 is
stronger than “1 /∈ M” unless M is a cone.
Next, we enumerate equivalent conditions for a given ρ ∈ R to be a
GDV.
Proposition 4.5 Let ρ ∈ R. The following are equivalent:
1. ρ is a GDV.
2. ρ(−m) ≤ 0 for any m ∈ M.
3. ρ∗(Q) ≥ (ρ0)∗(Q) for any Q ∈ P , that is, ρ is represented as
ρ(x) = sup
Q∈Q
{EQ[−x]− ρ
∗(Q)}.
4. ρ(−x) ∈ [−ρ̂0(x), ρ̂0(−x)] for any x ∈ L.
5. {ρ0 ≤ 0} ⊂ {ρ ≤ 0}.
Proof. 1⇒2: For any m ∈ M, we have ρ(−m) ≤ ρ0(−m) ≤ 0 by (3.1).
2⇒3: This is from (4.3).
3⇒4: For any x ∈ L, we have
ρ(x) = sup
Q∈Q
{EQ[−x]− ρ
∗(Q)} ≤ sup
Q∈Q
{
EQ[−x]− (ρ
0)∗(Q)
}
= ρ̂0(x).
Moreover, the convexity of ρ yields that −ρ(−x) ≤ ρ(x) ≤ ρ̂0(x).
4⇒1: Note that Q 6= ∅ holds under condition 4. Thus, ρ̂0 ≤ ρ0 by Proposi-
tion 3.8. In addition, ρ̂0(0) ≥ 0 since ρ(0) = 0. So that, ρ0(0) = ρ̂0(0) = 0
because ρ0(0) ≤ 0. As a result, Lemma 3.10 ensures that ρ is a GDV.
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3⇒5: Recall that Q 6= ∅ is ensured under condition 3. We have
ρ0(x) ≤ 0 ⇒ for any ε > 0, there exists m ∈ M such that ε +m+ x ≥ 0
⇒ for any ε > 0, ε + EQ[x] + (ρ
0)∗(Q) ≥ 0 for any Q ∈ Q
⇒ for any ε > 0, ε + EQ[x] + ρ
∗(Q) ≥ 0 for any Q ∈ Q
⇒ ρ(x) ≤ ε for any ε > 0
⇒ ρ(x) ≤ 0.
5⇒2: Remark that we have ρ0(−m) ≤ 0 for any m ∈ M. Thus, −m ∈ {ρ ≤
0} for any m ∈ M. ✷
4.1 Relationship with risk indifference price
When M is a convex cone, ρ ∈ R is a GDV if and only if it is a risk indiffer-
ence price, as shown in Theorem 3.4 of [2]. However, we cannot generalize
this result to our setting. In this subsection, we investigate relationship be-
tween GDVs and risk indifference prices. We start with the definition of
risk indifference prices.
Definition 4.6 For a given [−∞,∞]-valued functional f on L, we define a
functional I( f ) on L as
I( f )(x) := inf
{
r ∈ R| inf
m∈M
f (r+m+ x) ≤ inf
m∈M
f (m)
}
.
In particular, when ρ is a convex risk measure, I(ρ) is said the risk indiffer-
ence price induced by ρ; and is represented as
I(ρ)(x) = inf
{
r ∈ R| inf
m∈M
ρ(m+ x)− r ≤ inf
m∈M
ρ(m)
}
.
I(ρ)(−x) describes the risk indifference seller’s price for x induced by ρ
as introduced in Xu [34]. Selling x for a price greater than I(ρ)(−x), the
investor can find a suitable strategy from M so that the risk measured by ρ
does not increase. For more details on I(ρ), see [2], [22] and [34]. Now, we
prepare a lemma as follows:
Lemma 4.7 Let ρ be a convex risk measure on L. If I(ρ) is (−∞,∞]-valued, then
we have infm∈M ρ(m) ∈ R and that I(ρ) is a convex risk measure with
I(ρ)∗(g) =
{
(ρ0)∗(g) + ρ∗(g) + infm∈M ρ(m), if g ∈ L
∗
,
∞, otherwise.
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If I(ρ) ∈ R in addition, then Q 6= ∅ and
I(ρ)(x) = sup
Q∈Q
{
EQ[−x]− (ρ
0)∗(Q)− ρ∗(Q)− inf
m∈M
ρ(m)
}
.
Proof. We can see the lemma by the same way as the proof of Lemma
2.10 in [2] together with the above Lemma 3.1. ✷
We illustrate an example of a GDVwhich is not a risk indifference price;
and two examples of GDVs which are risk indifference prices.
Example 4.8 We consider a simple illiquid market model as introduced in
Example 2.4. Let Ω = {ω1,ω2}, P({ωi}) > 0 for i = 1, 2, and
S(ω) =
{
1 if ω = ω1,
−1 if ω = ω2.
The set of 0-attainable claims is given as
M = {αS− α2|α ∈ R} − L+ = {αS− α
2|α ∈ [−1/2, 1/2]} − L+.
For a probability measure Q, we denote q := Q({ω1}), and identify Qwith
q. Thus, we regard [0, 1] as the set of all probability measures. We have
(ρ0)∗(q) = sup
α∈[− 12 ,
1
2 ]
{
Eq[αS]− α
2
}
= sup
α∈[− 12 ,
1
2 ]
α(2q− 1− α) =
(2q− 1)2
4
.
Next, we define
ρ(x) = sup
q∈[0,1]
{
Eq[−x]−
|2q− 1|
4
}
.
Since ρ(x) ≤ 0 whenever ρ̂0(x) ≤ 0, Proposition 4.5 implies that ρ is a GDV.
Moreover, for x = − 121{ω1}, ρ(x) =
1
4 and ρ̂
0(x) = 516 , namely, ρ 6= ρ̂
0.
We show that ρ is not a risk indifference price. Suppose that ρ is rep-
resented as ρ = I(η) for some convex risk measure η. Since (ρ0)∗(q) ≤
ρ∗(q) ≤ |2q−1|4 by Proposition 4.5 and (2.4), we have ρ
∗(q) = (ρ0)∗(q) for
q ∈ {0, 12 , 1}. In addition, Lemma 4.7 implies that ρ
∗(q) = I(η)∗(q) =
(ρ0)∗(q) + η∗(q) + infm∈M η(m). Thus, η
∗(q) + infm∈M η(m) = 0 for q ∈
{0, 12 , 1}. Hence, the convexity of η
∗ implies that η∗(q) + infm∈M η(m) = 0
for any q ∈ [0, 1], that is, ρ∗ = (ρ0)∗, which is a contradiction. ✷
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Example 4.9 (Exponential utility indifference price) For γ > 0, we setΦ(α) =
eγ|α| − 1 and L = MΦ. For an agent having an initial capital c ∈ R and
an exponential utility function with risk-aversion γ, the utility indifference
seller’s price p(−x) for x ∈ L is defined implicitly as
sup
m∈M
E[− exp{−γ(c+m)}] = sup
m∈M
E[− exp{−γ(c+ p(−x) +m− x)}].
Formore details, see Biagini et al. [4]. Denoting ργ(x) :=
1
γ logE[exp{−γx}],
we have p(x) = I(ργ)(x). Note that ργ is called an entropic risk measure.
Assuming E[m] ≤ 0 for any m ∈ M additionally, we have infm∈M ργ(m) =
0, that is, p(−m) ≤ 0 for any m ∈ M. Hence, p is a GDV. ✷
Example 4.10 (Shortfall risk measure) We consider an agent selling a claim
x with price r ∈ R; and selecting m ∈ M as her strategy. Her shortfall risk
is then defined as a weighted expectation of the shortfall of her final cash-
flow r + m − x with a loss function l. Note that l represents her attitude
towards risk. Now, we assume that l is given as l(α) = Φ(0 ∧ α); and
L = MΦ. For simplicity, we assume the continuity of l. To suppress the
shortfall risk less than a certain level δ > 0 which she can endure, the least
price she can accept is given as
ρl(−x) := inf{r ∈ R| there exists m ∈ M such that E[l(r+m− x)] ≤ δ}.
As seen in Arai [1], ρl is a convex risk measure with the Fatou property
under mild conditions. We define ρ̂l as ρ̂l(x) := ρl(x) − ρl(0). Denot-
ing ρ1l (x) := inf{r ∈ R|E[l(r + x)] ≤ δ}, we have ρ̂l = I(ρ
1
l ). As seen
in the previous example, supposing E[m] ≤ 0 for any m ∈ M, we have
infm∈M ρ
1
l (m) = ρ
1
l (0), from which ρ̂l is a GDV. ✷
As seen in Example 4.8, a GDV is not necessarily a risk indifference
price. Accordingly, the following theorem gives sufficient conditions for a
GDV to be a risk indifference price; and for a risk indifference price to be a
GDV.
Theorem 4.11 Let ρ ∈ R. We consider the following conditions:
1. There exists an η ∈ R with infm∈M η(m) = 0 such that ρ = I(η).
1′. There exists a convex risk measure η with η(0) = infm∈M η(m) such that
ρ = I(η)
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2. There exists a convex set A ⊂ L including 0 with A+ L+ ⊂ A such that
for any x ∈ L
ρ(x) = inf{r ∈ R|there exists m ∈ M such that r+m+ x ∈ A}. (4.4)
3. ρ is a GDV.
Then 1⇒1′ ⇔2⇒3 holds. Moreover, when ρ∗ − (ρ0)∗ is convex and M is given
as M = M0 − L+ for some σ(L, LΨ)-compact convex set M0 including 0, all the
above conditions are equivalent.
Proof. 1⇒1′ is obvious.
1′ ⇒2: Denoting η′ := η − infm∈M η(m), we have η
′(0) = infm∈M η
′(m) =
0. Let A := {x ∈ L|η′(x) ≤ 0} and Aρ := {x ∈ L|ρ(x) ≤ 0}. Note that A is
a convex set including 0 with A+ L+ ⊂ A. We have
{x ∈ L| there exists m′ ∈ M such that m′ + x ∈ A} ⊂ Aρ,
since ρ(x) = I(η)(x) = infm∈M η
′(m+ x) ≤ η′(m′ + x) ≤ 0 if x belongs to
the LHS. Thus, we have
ρ(x) = inf{r ∈ R|x+ r ∈ Aρ}
≤ inf{r ∈ R|there exists m ∈ M such that m+ x+ r ∈ A}.
As for the reverse inequality, we have, for any ε > 0,
ρ(x) = inf{r ∈ R| inf
m∈M
η′(m+ x) ≤ r}
≥ inf{r ∈ R|there exists m ∈ M such that η′(m+ x) ≤ r+ ε}
= inf{r ∈ R|there exists m ∈ M such that m+ x+ r ∈ A} − ε.
By the arbitrariness of ε, we obtain (4.4).
2⇒1′: Denote η(x) := inf{r ∈ R|r + x ∈ A}. Noting that η > −∞ by
η ≥ ρ; and η(0) = 0 by 0 ∈ A, we obtain that η is a normalized convex risk
measure by the conditions on A. Hence, it suffices to see
inf
m∈M
η(m+ x) = ρ(x), (4.5)
since infm∈M η(m) = 0 holds if (4.5) holds. Remark that infm∈M η(m+ x) =
∞ ⇔ r + m + x /∈ A for any r ∈ R and any m ∈ M ⇔ ρ(x) = ∞. Then,
we suppose that both infm∈M η(m + x) and ρ(x) are less than ∞. For any
r > infm∈M η(m + x), there exists an m ∈ M such that r + m + x ∈ A.
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Thus, ρ(x) ≤ r. On the other hand, for any r > ρ(x), there exists an m ∈
M such that r + m + x ∈ A, that is, η(m + x) ≤ r, which implies that
infm∈M η(m+ x) ≤ r. As a result, we have (4.5).
2⇒3: As seen in the above, ρ = I(η) holds under condition 2. Then,
Lemma 4.7 provides that ρ∗ = I(η)∗ = η∗ + (ρ0)∗. Since η∗ ≥ 0 by
η(0) = 0, we have ρ∗ ≥ (ρ0)∗. Proposition 4.5 implies that ρ is a GDV.
As for the second assertion, it suffices to see the implication 3⇒1. De-
fine ρ˜(x) := supQ∈Q{EQ[−x] − ρ
∗(Q) + (ρ0)∗(Q)}. Since ρ˜ ≥ ρ > −∞
and ρ˜(0) ≤ 0 by Proposition 4.5, ρ˜ is a convex risk measure with the Fa-
tou property. Remark that ρ˜(m) ≥ supQ∈Q{−ρ
∗(Q)} = ρ(0) = 0 for any
m ∈ M, that is, ρ˜(0) = 0 and infm∈M ρ˜(m) = 0. Thus, we have
I(ρ˜)(x) = inf
m∈M
ρ˜(m+ x)− inf
m∈M
ρ˜(m) = inf
m∈M0
ρ˜(m+ x)
= inf
m∈M0
sup
Q∈Q
{EQ[−m− x]− ρ
∗(Q) + (ρ0)∗(Q)}
= sup
Q∈Q
inf
m∈M0
{EQ[−m− x]− ρ
∗(Q) + (ρ0)∗(Q)}
= sup
Q∈Q
{EQ[−x]− ρ
∗(Q)} = ρ(x),
since the minimax theorem (Theorem 3.1 of Simons [32]) is applicable by
the compactness of M0 and the convexity of ρ
∗ − (ρ0)∗. ✷
Remark 4.12 1. Theorem 3.4 in [2] asserts that, when M is a convex
cone, the following are equivalent for ρ ∈ R: (a) ρ is a GDV; (b) there
exists η ∈ R such that ρ = I(η); and (c) condition 2 in Theorem 4.11.
Now, recall that infm∈M η(m) = 0 automatically holds in the convex
cone markets. That’s because condition 1 in Theorem 4.11 is stronger
than the above condition (b).
2. When M is a convex cone, ρ˜ coincides with ρ; and infm∈M ρ(m) = 0
holds. Thus, we do not need the minimax theorem to see the implica-
tion 3⇒1 in the convex cone case.
3. Madan and Cherny [25] developed a theory for bid and ask prices.
They gave a framework of bid and ask prices which are expressed
in a similar way with (4.4), employing the concept of acceptability
indexes and acceptability levels.
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4.2 Extension to conical market
Here we consider a conical market generated by the convex constrained
market M. We define a convex cone set generated by M as
M′ := {cm|c ≥ 0,m ∈ M};
and regard it as the set of all 0-attainable claims in the extended market.
Now, for a given ρ ∈ R, we denote
ρ′(x) := sup
Q∈Q0
{EQ[−x]− ρ
∗(Q)} .
Note that ρ′ is a convex risk measure on L with the Fatou property when-
everQ0 6= ∅, and vice versa. In addition, ρ′ ∈ R if and only if infQ∈Q0 ρ
∗(Q) =
0. We show the following proposition:
Proposition 4.13 For any GDV ρ (for the market M), if ρ′ ∈ R, then ρ′ is the
largest GDV for the extended conical market M′ smaller than ρ.
Proof. Since EQ[m
′] ≤ 0 for any m′ ∈ M′ and Q ∈ Q0, we have
ρ′(−m′) = sup
Q∈Q0
{
EQ[m
′]− ρ∗(Q)
}
≤ sup
Q∈Q0
{−ρ∗(Q)} = 0
for any m′ ∈ M′, which means that ρ′ is a GDV for M′ by Proposition 4.5.
Now, ρ′ is smaller than ρ, that is, ρ′(x) ≤ ρ(x) for any x ∈ L. Taking ρ1
a GDV for M′ smaller than ρ arbitrarily, we show ρ′ ≥ ρ1. Denoting by ρ
∗
1
the penalty function of ρ1, we have ρ
∗
1(Q) = supx∈L {EQ[x]− ρ1(−x)} ≥
supx∈L {EQ[x]− ρ(−x)} = ρ
∗(Q) for any Q ∈ Q. Note that, for any Q /∈
Q0, there exists anm′1 ∈ M
′ such thatEQ[m
′
1] > 0, that is, supm′∈M′ EQ[m
′] =
∞ by the cone property of M′. Hence, for any Q ∈ Q\Q0, we have
ρ∗1(Q) ≥ sup
m′∈M′
{
EQ[m
′]− ρ1(−m
′)
}
≥ sup
m′∈M′
EQ[m
′] = ∞.
Consequently, we obtain
ρ′(x) = sup
Q∈Q0
{EQ[−x]− ρ
∗(Q)} ≥ sup
Q∈Q0
{EQ[−x]− ρ
∗
1(Q)} = ρ1(x)
for any x ∈ L. ✷
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4.3 Coherent good deal valuations
When M is a convex cone, ρ̂0 is coherent, that is, there is a coherent GDV
whenever a GDV exists. On the other hand, in our setting, since ρ̂0 is not
necessarily coherent, there might be no coherent GDV even if a GDV exists.
Now, we illustrate an equivalent condition for the existence of a coherent
GDV.
Proposition 4.14 Q0 6= ∅ if and only if there exists a coherent GDV.
Proof. Suppose Q0 6= ∅. Taking a Q ∈ Q0, we define ρQ(x) := EQ[−x]
for any x ∈ L. Note that ρQ is in R and coherent. We have then ρQ(−m) =
EQ[m] ≤ supm∈M EQ[m] = 0 for any m ∈ M, from which ρQ is a GDV.
To see the reverse implication, let ρ be a coherent GDV. Since ρ is co-
herent, ρ∗ takes the values 0 and ∞ only. Defining Q˜ := {Q ∈ Q|ρ∗(Q) =
0}, we have that Q˜ is nonempty and ρ(x) = supQ∈Q˜ EQ[−x]. Proposi-
tion 4.5 implies that, for any m ∈ M and any Q˜ ∈ Q˜, 0 ≥ ρ(−m) =
supQ∈Q˜ EQ[m] ≥ EQ˜[m]. Thus, supm∈M EQ˜[m] = 0 for any Q˜ ∈ Q˜, that
is, Q˜ ⊂ Q0. ✷
5 Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing
In this section, we prove a Kreps-Yan type FTAP with convex constraints.
Basically, the Kreps-Yan theorem ([23] or Section 5 in [14]) asserts, very
roughly speaking, the equivalence between the existence of an equivalent
martingale measure and the NFL: M ∩ L+ = {0}. [2] proved, for the case
where M is a convex cone, the equivalence among the NFL, Q0 ∩Qe 6= ∅
and the existence of a relevant GDV. Noting that Q and Q0 coincide when
M is a convex cone, and taking Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 3.14 into account,
we naturally expect the equivalence between the NFL and either condition
1 or 1′ of the following theorem, whereas neither of them actually holds.
On the other hand, the equivalence between the NFL and the existence of a
relevant GDV still holds. The following is an FTAP formarkets with convex
constraints:
Theorem 5.1 As for the following conditions, we have 1′ ⇒4⇔3⇔2⇒1.
1. Qe 6= ∅ and infQ∈Qe(ρ
0)∗(Q) = 0.
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1′. There exists a Q ∈ Qe with (ρ0)∗(Q) = 0.
2. M ∩ L+ = {0}.
3. There exists a relevant GDV.
4. ρ̂0 is a relevant GDV.
Proof. 2⇒1: For each δ ∈ (0, 1], we define a set Bδ as
Bδ := {x ∈ L|0 ≤ x ≤ 1,E[x] ≥ δ}. (5.1)
Note that Bδ is compact in σ(L, L
Ψ) and M ∩ Bδ = ∅. Thus, Proposition
2.13 ensures the existence of Qδ ∈ Q satisfying
sup
m∈M
EQδ [m] < infx∈Bδ
EQδ [x]. (5.2)
Now, we denote Q(k) := Q2−k ∈ Q (Q2−k is defined in (5.2) for δ = 2
−k)
for any k ∈ N; αk :=
∥∥∥dQ(k)dP ∥∥∥
Ψ
∨ 1 (‖y‖Ψ := inf{c > 0|E[Ψ(y/c)] ≤ 1});
and Cn := ∑
∞
k=n
2−k
αk
< ∞ for any n ∈ N. Moreover, we define βnk :=
2−k
Cnαk
for any k ≥ n; and Q˜(n) := ∑∞k=n β
n
kQ
(k) for any n ∈ N. Note that Q˜(n) is a
probability measure equivalent to P, since ∑∞k=n β
n
k = 1 andQ
(k)(A) > 0 for
any A ∈ F with P(A) > 2−k by (5.2). Now, we denote γi := ∑
n+i
k=n β
n
k
dQ(k)
dP
for i = 1, 2, . . . . Then, {γi} is a Cauchy sequence in ‖ · ‖Ψ; and Lemma 3.3
yields dQ˜
(n)
dP ∈ L
Ψ. Moreover, noting that 2−n ∈ B2−k for any k ≥ n, we have,
for any n ∈ N,
sup
m∈M
EQ˜(n)[m] = sup
m∈M
∞
∑
k=n
βnkEQ(k)[m] ≤
∞
∑
k=n
βnk sup
m∈M
EQ(k)[m]
<
∞
∑
k=n
βnk inf
x∈B
2−k
EQ(k)[x] ≤
∞
∑
k=n
βnk2
−n = 2−n,
which implies Q˜(n) ∈ Qe with (ρ0)∗(Q˜(n)) < 2−n. As a result, we obtain
infQ∈Qe(ρ
0)∗(Q) = 0.
4⇒3: Obvious.
3⇒2: Let ρ be a relevant GDV. Since ρ(−z) > 0 for all z ∈ L+\{0} by
the relevance, it suffices to see that ρ(−m) ≤ 0 for any m ∈ M. If there
exists an m ∈ M with ρ(−m) > 0, then we can find a Q ∈ Q such that
EQ[m] > ρ
∗(Q) ≥ (ρ0)∗(Q) = supm∈M EQ[m] by Proposition 4.5. This is a
contradiction.
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2⇒4: Since condition 2 implies condition 1, ρ̂0 is a GDV by Theorem 4.2.
Next, we show the relevance of ρ̂0. For any z ∈ L+\{0}, z ∧ 1 belongs
to Bδ for some δ ∈ (0, 1], where Bδ is defined in (5.1). Since Bδ ∩ M = ∅,
Proposition 2.13 implies the existence ofQ ∈ Q satisfying supm∈M EQ[m] <
infx∈Bδ EQ[x]. Then, we have 0 ≤ supm∈M EQ[m] < EQ[z ∧ 1] ≤ EQ[z].
Consequently, ρ̂0 is relevant.
1′ ⇒4: Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 3.14 imply that ρ̂0 is a relevant GDV. ✷
Remark 5.2 We can regard Theorem 5.1 as a generalization of Corollary
9.32 in [18].
In order to complete Theorem 5.1, we illustrate counterexamples for the
implications which are not shown.
Example 5.3 (Counterexample for 1⇒2) Setting Ω = {ωk|k ∈ N} and
P({ωk}) = 2
−k for each k ∈ N, we define random variables Sk, k ∈ N
as
Sk(ω) =
{
1, if ω = ωk,
0, if ω 6= ωk,
andM = co{S1, S2, . . . }− L+. Remark that any elementm ∈ co{S1, S2, . . . }
is expressed asm = ∑∞k=1 λkSk, where the sequence {λk}k∈N satisfies λk ≥ 0
for any k ≥ 1, ∑∞k=1 λk = 1 and λk = 0 except for finitely many ks. This
model then does not satisfy condition 2.
Next, we make sure of condition 1. To this end, we define for each
n ∈ N,
Qn({ωk}) :=
{
1
n , if k ≤ n− 1,
2n−k−1
n , otherwise.
We can see that eachQn is a probability measure equivalent toP; and
dQn
dP ≤
2n−1
n . For m ∈ co{S1, S2, . . . } with m = ∑
∞
k=1 λkSk, we have
EQn [m] =
∞
∑
k=1
λkQn({ωk}) ≤
∞
∑
k=1
λk
n
=
1
n
.
Thus, we obtain, for any n ∈ N,
(ρ0)∗(Qn) = sup
m∈M
EQn [m] = sup
m∈co{S1,S2,... }
EQn [m] ≤
1
n
,
from which condition 1 follows.
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Example 5.4 (Counterexample for 4⇒1′) We take Ω = {ωk|k ∈ Z} and
a probability measure P with P({ωk}) > 0 for each k ∈ Z. Further, we
define random variables Sk, k ∈ Z as
Sk(ω) =

1, if ω = ωk,
−1, if ω = ωk−1,
0, otherwise,
and M = co{Sk|k ∈ Z} − L+.
Now, we see that this model satisfies condition 4. We define, for each
i ∈ Z and j ∈ N,
Qij({ωk}) :=
(
1
j
−
|k− i|
j2
)
∨ 0.
We can see that each Qij is a probability measure with bounded density
dQij
dP .
For any m ∈ M with representationm = ∑∞k=1 λkSk, we have
EQij
[m] =
∞
∑
k=1
λkEQij
[Sk] =
∞
∑
k=1
λk
{
Qij({ωk})− Q
i
j({ωk−1})
}
≤
1
j2
.
We have then (ρ0)∗(Qij) =
1
j2
, that is,Qij ∈ Q. Thus,Q 6= ∅ and infQ∈Q(ρ
0)∗(Q) =
0, which ensure that ρ̂0 is a GDV. On the other hand, taking a z ∈ L+\{0}
arbitrarily, we can find an ε > 0 and an i ∈ Z satisfying z ≥ ε1{ωi}. Hence,
we have EQij
[z] ≥ εQij({ωi}) =
ε
j for any j ∈ N. For a sufficient large j, we
have EQij
[z] > (ρ0)∗(Qij), that is, ρ̂
0(−z) > 0.
Next, we see that condition 1′ does not hold. Since condition 4 holds, so
does condition 1 by Theorem 5.1, that is, Qe is nonempty. For any Q ∈ Qe,
there exists a kQ ∈ Z such that Q({ωkQ})−Q({ωkQ−1}) > 0. Indeed, since
K0 := {k ∈ Z|Q({ωk}) ≥ Q({ω0})} is finite, we can take kQ = minK0.
Hence, we have, for any Q ∈ Qe,
(ρ0)∗(Q) = sup
m∈M
EQ[m] ≥ EQ[SkQ ] = Q({ωkQ})− Q({ωkQ−1}) > 0,
which denies condition 1′.
Here we give an equivalent condition to condition 1′ in Theorem 5.1.
Proposition 5.5 There exists a relevant coherent GDV if and only if Qe ∩Q0 is
nonempty.
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Proof. “if” part: This is shown by a similar way with Proposition 4.14.
Taking a Q ∈ Qe ∩Q0, we define ρQ(x) := EQ[−x] for any x ∈ L. Then, ρQ
is a coherent GDV which is relevant.
“only if” part: This follows from the Halmos-Savage theorem (see e.g.
Theorem 25 in [13]). Now, we give just a sketch of proof.
Let ρ be a relevant coherent GDV. Denoting A := {x ∈ L|ρ(−x) ≤ 0},
we have supx∈A EQ[x] = ρ
∗(Q) for any Q ∈ Q. Now, we consider Bδ
defined in (5.1). Since A ∩ Bδ = ∅ for any δ ∈ (0, 1], the same separating
argument as Proposition 2.13 implies that, for any δ ∈ (0, 1], there exists a
Q ∈ Q such that
ρ∗(Q) = sup
x∈A
EQ[x] < inf
z∈Bδ
EQ[z],
since A is σ(L, LΨ)-closed. Now, for each δ ∈ (0, 1], we denote
Qδ := {Q ∈ Q| inf
z∈Bδ
EQ[z] > ρ
∗(Q)}.
Remark thatQδ is stable for countable unions. Then, we can find aQδ ∈ Qδ
satisfying P({dQδdP > 0}) = maxQ∈Qδ P({
dQ
dP > 0}). In addition, we can see
that P({dQδdP > 0}) = 1 by contradiction. Since δ ∈ Bδ, we have ρ
∗(Qδ) <
δ, from which ρ∗(Qδ) = 0 holds, since ρ
∗ takes the values 0 and ∞ only.
Hence, (ρ0)∗(Qδ) = 0 by Proposition 4.5, that is, Qδ ∈ Q
e ∩Q0. ✷
5.1 An extension theorem
We assume that any x ∈ L is priced at ρ(−x), where ρ is a GDV. Then
x − ρ(−x) is a 0-attainable claim. Now, we extend our market by adding
all these claims to M. More precisely, the set of 0-attainable claims for the
extended market is represented as
Mρ := {x− ρ(−x)|x ∈ L, ρ(−x) < ∞} − L+
= {x ∈ L|ρ(−x) = 0} − L+ = {x ∈ L|ρ(−x) ≤ 0}.
Remark that Mρ is a convex set including M. Since Mρ is closed in σ(L, LΨ)
by Theorem 2.12, the NFL for the extended market is equivalent to Mρ ∩
L+ = {0}, which is the no-arbitrage condition. We have the following
theorem:
Theorem 5.6 Let ρ be a GDV. The following are equivalent:
1. ρ is relevant.
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2. −ρ̂0(x− z) < ρ(−x) for any x ∈ L and z ∈ L+\{0}.
3. −ρ0(x− z) < ρ(−x) for any x ∈ L and z ∈ L+\{0}.
4. Mρ ∩ L+ = {0}.
Proof. The implications 2⇒3⇒1⇔4 are shown by the same way as The-
orem 4.3 in [2]. Then we have only to see the implication 1⇒2. For any
z ∈ L+\{0}, there exists Qz ∈ Q such that EQz [z/2] > ρ
∗(Qz) by the
relevance of ρ. Thus, Proposition 4.5 implies that EQz [z] > 2ρ
∗(Qz) ≥
ρ∗(Qz) + (ρ0)∗(Qz). Therefore, for any x ∈ L, we have
−ρ̂0(x− z) = inf
Q∈Q
{
EQ[x− z] + (ρ
0)∗(Q)
}
≤ EQz [x− z] + (ρ
0)∗(Qz)
< EQz [x]− ρ
∗(Qz) ≤ sup
Q∈Q
{EQ[x]− ρ
∗(Q)} = ρ(−x).
✷
6 Conclusions
We study properties of good deal bounds for incomplete markets with con-
vex constraints. In Section 3, we study properties of superhedging cost ρ0
and its largest minorant with the Fatou property ρ̂0. Next, we see that the
existence of a GDV is equivalent to “Q 6= ∅ and infQ∈Q(ρ
0)∗(Q) = 0”
in Theorem 4.2; and enumerate equivalent conditions for a given ρ ∈ R
to be a GDV in Proposition 4.5. Moreover, we introduce an example of a
GDV which is not a risk indifference price; and look into relationship be-
tween GDVs and risk indifference prices. Furthermore, we prove an FTAP
under convex constraints in Theorem 5.1. Among others, the equivalence
between the NFL and the existence of a relevant GDV is proved. More-
over, we illustrate counterexamples to see that neither Qe ∩ Q0 6= ∅ nor
infQ∈Qe(ρ
0)∗(Q) = 0 is equivalent to the NFL.
References
[1] ARAI, T. (2011) Good deal bounds induced by shortfall risk, SIAM J. Finan-
cial Math., 2, 1-21.
[2] ARAI, T. AND FUKASAWA, M. (2014) Convex risk measures for good deal
bounds, Mathematical Finance, 24, 464-484.
29
[3] BIAGINI, S. AND FRITTELLI, M. (2009) On the extension of the Namioka-
Klee theorem and on the Fatou property for risk measures, in Optimality and
risk: modern trends in mathematical finance, The Kabanov Festschrift,
Delbaen, Rasonyi, Stricker eds., 1-28, Springer.
[4] BIAGINI, S., FRITTELLI, M. AND GRASSELLI, M. (2011) Indifference price
with general semimartingales, Mathematical Finance, 21, 423-446.
[5] BION-NADAL, J. (2009) Bid-Ask dynamic pricing in financial markets with
transaction costs and liquidity risk, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 45,
738-750.
[6] BION-NADAL, J. AND DI NUNNO, G. (2013) Dynamic no-good-deal pric-
ing measures and extension theorems for linear operators on L∞, to appear in
Finance and Stochastics.
[7] CARASSUS, L., PHAM, H. AND TOUZI, N. (2001) No arbitrage in discrete
time under portfolio constraints, Mathematical Finance, 11, 315-329.
[8] CHERIDITO, P. AND LI, T. (2009) Risk measures on Orlicz hearts, Mathe-
matical Finance, 19, 189-214.
[9] COCHRANE, J.H. AND SAA´-REQUEJO, J. (2000) Beyond arbitrage: good-
deal asset price bounds in incomplete markets, Journal of Political Economy,
108, 79-119.
[10] CUOCO, D. (1997) Optimal consumption and equilibrium prices with port-
folio constraints and stochastic income, Journal of Economic Theory, 72, 33-
73.
[11] CVITANIC´, J. AND KARATZAS, I. (1992) Convex duality in constrained
portfolio optimization, Annals of Applied Probability, 2, 767-818.
[12] CVITANIC´, J. AND KARATZAS, I. (1993) Hedging contingent claims with
constrained portfolios, Annals of Applied Probability, 3, 652-681.
[13] DELBAEN, F. (2012)Monetary Utility Functions, Osaka University CSFI
Lecture Notes Series, Osaka University Press.
[14] DELBAEN, F. AND SCHACHERMAYER, W. (2006) The mathematics of ar-
bitrage, Springer Finance. Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
[15] EDGAR, G.A. AND SUCHESTON, L. (1992) Stopping times and directed
processes, Cambridge University Press.
30
[16] EVSTIGNEEV, I.V., SCHU¨RGER, K. AND TAKSAR, M.I.(2004) On the
fundamental theorem of asset pricing: random constraints and Bang-Bang no-
arbitrage criteria, Mathematical Finance, 14, 201-221.
[17] FO¨LLMER, H. AND KRAMKOV, D. (1997) Optional decompositions under
constraints, Probability Theory and Related Fields, 109, 1-25.
[18] FO¨LLMER, H. AND SCHIED, A. (2011) Stochastic Finance 3rd edition, De
Gruyter, Berlin.
[19] JASCHKE, S. AND KU¨CHLER, U. (2001) Coherent risk measures and good-
deal bounds, Finance and Stochastics, 5, 181-200.
[20] KARATZAS, I. AND KOU, S. (1996) On the pricing of contingent claims
under constraints, Annals of Applied Probability, 6, 321-369.
[21] KARDARAS, C. (2012) Market viability via absence of arbitrage of the first
kind, Finance and Stochastics, 16, 651-667.
[22] KLO¨PPEL, S. AND SCHWEIZER, M. (2005) Dynamic indifference valua-
tion via convex risk measures, NCCR FINRISKworking paperNo.209, ETH
Zu¨rich..
[23] KREPS, D.M. (1981) Arbitrage and equilibrium in economies with infinitely
many commodities, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 8, 15-35.
[24] LARSEN, K. AND ZˇITKOVIC´, G. (2013) On utility maximization under
convex portfolio constraints, Annals of Applied Probability, 23, 665-692.
[25] MADAN, D. AND CHERNY, A. (2010)Markets as a counterparty: an intro-
duction to conic finance, International Journal of Theoretical and Applied
Finance, 13, 1149-1177.
[26] PENNANEN, T. (2011) Arbitrage and deflators in illiquid markets, Finance
and Stochastics, 15, 57-83.
[27] PENNANEN, T. (2011) Superhedging in illiquid markets, Mathematical
Finance, 21, 519-540.
[28] PENNANEN, T. AND PENNER, I. (2010) Hedging of claims with physical
delivery under convex transaction costs, SIAM Journal on Financial Mathe-
matics, 1, 158-178.
[29] RAO, M.M. AND REN, Z.D. (1991) Theory of Orlicz spaces, Marcel
Dekker, Inc., New York.
31
[30] ROKHLIN, D.B. (2005) An extended version of the Dalang-Morton-
Willinger theorem under portfolio constraints, Theory of Probability & Its
Applications, 49, 429-443.
[31] ROUX, A. (2011) The fundamental theorem of asset pricing in the presence
of bid-ask and interest rate spreads, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 47,
159-163.
[32] Simons, S. (1999) Minimax and Monotonicity, Lecture Notes in Mathe-
matics, 1693, Springer.
[33] STAUM, J. (2004) Fundamental theorems of asset pricing for good deal
bounds, Mathematical Finance, 14, 141-161.
[34] XU, M. (2006) Risk measure pricing and hedging in incomplete markets,
Annals of Finance, 2, 51-71.
32
